Introduction
China"s fast-growing economic ties with Africa have attracted considerable attention. China"s trade (exports plus imports) with Africa increased steadily, albeit at a slow pace, in the 1990s, but surged from $9.5 billion in 2000, to $36.3 billion in 2005, and to $79.8 billion in 2009. Likewise, China has become one of the major capital providers for countries in Africa (UNCTAD, 2007) . According to the 2009 China Commerce Yearbook, China"s Outward Direct Investment (ODI) in Africa relative to its total ODI increased from 2.6% in 2003 to 9.8% in 2008. In fact, Africa has become the third largest recipient of China"s ODI in recent years (Besada et al., 2008) . In addition to trade and ODI, contracted projects are another important channel through which China interacts with Africa. These contracted projects include building of highways and roads, bridges, schools, shopping centers, housing and office buildings, water conservancy, dams, and power plants. The dollar value of China"s contracted projects dwarfs its ODI in Africa.
A very common view is that China"s interest in Africa is mainly driven by its concern to achieve more security of supply for natural resources, rather than relying on global markets.
1 Likewise, worries have been raised that Chinese investments could crowd out African manufacturing industry, causing unemployment. The number of high-quality jobs created by Chinese investments is perceived to be quite limited, since Chinese firms tend to bring along their own workers. Some other concerns include the possible negative impacts of China"s ODI on the environment, governance, and political reforms in Africa. Some observers criticize China"s policy as it tolerates, and passively exacerbates, authoritarian regimes and human right violations. For instance, Brookes (2007, p. 5) argues that "Chinese policies are …. troubling, especially when they support authoritarian African regimes, …. and exacerbate conflicts and human rights abuses in countries such as Sudan and Zimbabwe." 2 Yet, the benefits of China"s ODI may be enormous (UNCTAD, 2010a) . Chinese capital offers a valuable source of financing for African countries. Arguably, China has played a positive role in improving infrastructures, increasing productivity, boosting exports, and raising the living standards of millions of Africans. Sometimes, China"s ODI is credited for diversifying economic activity and creating jobs in manufacturing, mining, processing trade, and construction.
China, has diplomatic relations with China, is corrupt, democratic, and politically stable. In contrast, for the second dataset most political variables turn out to be insignificant. According to our estimates for the more recent period, China"s ODI in Africa is mainly driven by economic ties (trade and projects) and the drive for natural resources. The Heckman models suggest that the decision to invest in a country is driven by different factors than the decision how much to invest in a country.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the data used in this paper, while section 3 presents the hypotheses tested. Section 4 contains the estimation results and the final section concludes.
China's ODI in Africa
The ties between China and Africa can be traced back to the Bandung Conference in transformed from a purely political devise to a more market-oriented strategy. Before 1985, only state-owned and local-government-owned enterprises were allowed to invest overseas, but after 1985 private enterprises were permitted to apply for ODI projects. However, the state is still heavily involved in the FDI activity.
One Chinese policy action that has attracted some attention is the establishment of special economic zones in Africa. For China, special economic zones play a crucial role in its recent astonishing economic performance. Conceived to be an effective policy to promote the manufacturing sector and employment in Africa, China has assisted some African countries in developing their own special economic zones and encouraged Chinese companies to invest in them. The first special economic zone established under this initiative is in the Chambishi copper belt region in Zambia. Despite its potential benefits to the African economies, China"s involvement in these African special economic zones is not without critics. In the remainder of this paper, we will investigate the driving forces of Chinese ODI in Africa by testing various hypotheses, building upon our previous work (Cheung et al., 2010) . Table 1 shows the hypotheses to be tested. We distinguish between three groups of hypotheses. The first set of hypotheses refers to "standard" economic determinants of ODI on which we focused in our previous work. The second group of hypotheses focuses on political ties between the host country and China, while the third subset of hypotheses refers to political and institutional host country characteristics. Data availability primarily determined the list of hypotheses tested. The Appendix offers summary statistics of the data used and provides detailed information on their sources.
Hypotheses and data
The first hypothesis is that Chinese ODI in Africa is determined by the drive for new markets. Numerous studies (surveyed by Chakrabarti, 2001) show that FDI and market size are associated positively. In our previous work, we employed various proxies to test the importance of the market-seeking motive and it turned out that the host-country"s gross domestic product, measured in current US dollars in logs (GDP) outperforms other indicators.
GDP represents the market size and has been used in previous research (Frankel and Wei, 1996; Kravis and Lipsey, 1982; Wheeler and Mody, 1992) . Data were drawn from the World Development Indicators database of the World Bank. According to our first hypothesis, GDP is expected to have a positive impact on Chinese ODI in Africa.
The second hypothesis is that China will invest in African countries with which it has close economic ties. We use two proxies to test this hypothesis, namely EX and Proj. The first variable, EX, is the ratio of the host country"s total exports to China and total exports of the host country. 6 Although it is more common to use total trade, a case can be made that exports to China may be more relevant. China"s recent investment in Africa is generally perceived to follow the state-driven strategy of giving infrastructure and taking natural resources (cf. Foster et al., 2008) . If true, exports of African countries to China should increase ODI.
The second element, Proj, is the amount of China"s contracted projects in a host country normalized by the host-country"s population. Contracted projects are an important channel through which China interacts with Africa. Conceivably, contracted projects require endorsements by local authorities. Thus, the amount of contracted projects is indicative of the existing economic ties between China and the host country. To facilitate comparison across countries of different size, we normalize the data by the host-country"s population. We expect Proj to have a positive impact on China"s ODI.
The incentive to invest could be adversely affected by the presence of risk factors (Hypothesis 3). Traditionally, many African countries are considered to be very risky (Asiedu, 2002) . This explains why Africa receives little capital from Western investors. We include RISK to assess the effect of a host country"s risk characteristics on China"s ODI. This variable is the sum of the socioeconomic conditions index and the investment profile index as provided by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) divided by two. The socioeconomic conditions index is an assessment of the socioeconomic pressures at work in society that could constrain government action or fuel social dissatisfaction. The rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points (very low risk) and a minimum score of 0 points (very high risk). The subcomponents are:
unemployment, consumer confidence and poverty. The investment profile index is an assessment of factors affecting the risk to investment that are not covered by other political, economic and financial risk components. The rating assigned is the sum of three subcomponents, each with a maximum score of four points (very low risk) and a minimum score of 0 points (very high risk). The subcomponents are: contract viability/expropriation, profits repatriation and payment delays. Our RISK index runs from zero (high risk) to 12 (low risk). According to our third hypothesis, RISK is expected to have a positive impact on
Chinese ODI in Africa.
China seriously lacks natural resources to support its high rates of economic growth.
Growing at double digits requires access to natural resources. However, the evidence in Two endowment-related variables, Engy and Min, are used to examine whether China"s drive for natural resources impacts its ODI in Africa. Engy is a host country"s energy output that includes crude oil, natural gas, and coal output. Min is the mineral output that includes bauxite, copper, iron, and gold. Both Engy and Min are normalized by the host country"s gross national income. The data on Engy and Min were also retrieved from the World Bank.
The next set of hypotheses refers to China's political ties with the host country.
According to Besada et al. (2008, p. 15) , "A key element in understanding what is behind the growth in China"s involvement in Africa is the central Chinese precept that business should not be mixed with politics. China"s growing presence in Africa thus largely reflects commercial rather than other political considerations." In fact, these authors claim that the Chinese position is not to interfere in other countries' internal affairs and respecting their right to choose the road of development that best suits them. In contrast, it can be hypothesized that China has a preference for countries that are political allies (Hypothesis 5). We test this hypothesis using data on voting behavior in the UN General Assembly. Unfortunately, data on voting in line with China are not available and therefore we follow Barro and Lee (2005) and use a variable reflecting the extent to which a country voted in line with the USA, discarding those votes where more than 80 percent of the countries agreed (UN Voting). The data has been provided by Axel Dreher (see Dreher and Sturm, 2010) . The expected sign of this proxy is negative.
[Insert Table 1 Finally, Hypothesis 9 states that China prefers to invest in countries that are politically stable (Schneider and Frey, 1985) . There is some evidence in support of this hypothesis. For instance, Ramasamy et al. (2010) conclude that Chinese investments are attracted to countries that are politically unstable. For testing Hypothesis 9 we use the variable ExecChn, which is defined as the number of times in a year that effective control of the executive power changes hands (source: Databanks International). The expected sign is negative.
Censored Regression Results
The Chinese ODI data we are dealing with are left-censored, since either positive or zero ODI flows from China are observed. Using OLS would lead to biased estimates for coefficients and that is why we estimate Tobit models. We estimate various panel models that are specified as follows: [Insert Table 2 here]
The maximum likelihood estimates obtained from the panel data censored regression with the random effect specification are presented in Table 2 . 7 As explained before, the data refer to officially approved ODI for the period 1991-2005. Because data on some explanatory variables is not available, the regressions are based on data for 31 African countries.
Column (1) shows the results if we use GDP as proxy for market size. In addition, we include the variables EX, Proj, RISK, Engy and Min. We take this model, which is very similar to the model used in our previous work, as our base model. In line with our previous findings, we find that GDP is only significant at the 20% level of significance, while the variables Engy and Min are not significant. Of the two variables that measure China"s economic interactions with the host countries (exports and contracted projects), the contracted projects Proj is statistically significant at the 1 percent level, while EX is significant at 5 percent. Finally, RISK comes out significantly at the 10 percent level with the expected sign.
Column (2) shows the results when we add all the variables in the vectors POL and ICC simultaneously to the base model and follow the general to specific procedure. The main conclusion that follows from this regression is that inclusion of the political variables causes most of the economic determinants to become insignificant. Most coefficients of the variables in the vectors POL and ICC are in line with the hypotheses spelled out in Table 1 . In line with Hypothesis 7, the coefficient of Autocracy is significant, albeit only at the ten percent level, with a negative sign. So, our findings suggest that autocratic regimes do not receive more Chinese ODI (recall that a higher number for the variable Autocracy implies a more authoritarian regime). Our results also suggest that political allies of the US, politically unstable regimes, and countries without diplomatic ties with China receive less ODI from China. 7 The fixed effect specification would generate biased estimates (Greene, 2004a (Greene, , 2004b .
As an alternative approach, we add the variables in the vectors POL and ICC to the base model one by one; only those variables that turn out to be significant at the 10% level are
shown. The results are presented in columns (3)-(5) of Table 2 . It turns out that now also corruption is significant: more corrupt countries in Africa receive more ODI from China in the period under consideration (recall that a higher number of Corruption implies less corruption). Although corruption is often perceived to deter FDI because it represents an extra tax and increases investment costs (Bardhan, 1997; Abed and Davoodi, 2000 and Wei, 2000) , empirical evidence on the deterrent effect of corruption is very mixed. For instance, some studies found no significant corruption effect (Wheeler and Mody, 1992) and some found that corruption could, in fact, positively affect investment and economic growth (Swaleheen and Stansel, 2007) . Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) argues that investors who have been exposed to bribery at home will not be deterred by corruption abroad, but instead seek countries where corruption is prevalent. The similarities in the conditions of the institutional environment induce these investors to focus their FDI there. Our result that for the period under consideration China has a preference for investing in countries that are corrupt are in line with the findings of Swaleheen and Stansel (2007) and Cuervo-Cazurra (2006) .
Overall, our results suggest that in the period under consideration, political factors played a key role in China"s ODI decisions. Inclusion of political factors makes some previously significant economic determinants of ODI become insignificant, although exports and contracted projects remain significant in all specifications.
[Insert Table 3 here] (2) shows the results when we add all the variables in the vectors POL and ICC simultaneously and follow the general to specific procedure. In stark contrast to the results as reported in Table 2 , it turns out that none of the variables in the vectors POL and ICC are significant, while various traditional economic determinants of ODI turn out to be significant. The coefficients of GDP and Proj are significant, while there is also strong evidence for the resource-seeking motive as
Min turns out to be significant. Our findings for the resource-seeking motive are broadly in line with the results of Buckley et al. (2007) who also find that their proxy for this motive is only significant in the latter part of their sample period.
Likewise, when we add the variables in the vectors POL and ICC one by one to the base model, only Law and Order turns out to be significant at the 10% level as shown in column (3). However, the coefficient has the wrong sign, so our results do not confirm Hypothesis 8. 8
Results for Heckman models
So far we have found support for many of our hypotheses, although our results also suggest that during the first period political factors played a more important role than during the second. However, there is a potential problem with our estimates. In a Tobit regression, the occurrence of Chinese FDI and the amount of Chinese FDI are assumed to be determined by the same mechanism and the same set of explanatory variables. However, it might not be true that the occurrence of Chinese ODI and the amount of Chinese ODI are driven by the same variables. That is why we have applied a Heckman two-step estimator, which assumes two mechanisms: one for the occurrence of Chinese ODI and one for the amount of Chinese ODI.
Compared with the censored model used in the previous subsection, the two-step procedure
offers a framework to sequentially analyze the decision making process. The first decision is to make an investment or not. If the first decision is positive, then the amount of the investments has to be determined. The decision to invest or not is studied using the regression specification:
where t i D , = 1 if ODI i,t > 0 and is zero otherwise.
In essence, we postulate that the likelihood of China to invest in an African country is determined by the variables used in the censored regression. The technical issue of zerocensored data -selection bias problem is controlled for using the inverse Mills ratio (also known as the hazard rate). The ratio that contains information about the unobserved factors that determine China"s ODI in an African country is retrieved from equation (2) and will be included in the second stage of the Heckman regression. The significance of the inverse Mills ratio reflects the importance of selection bias. We adopted the Wooldrige (1995) procedure that extends the Heckman procedure to panel data. Specifically, the panel data Probit regression with random effects is used to estimate (2) with both zero and positive ODI observations. In the second stage of the 8 So our results are not in line with the findings of previous studies like Busse and Hefeker (2007) .
Heckman procedure, we assess the determinants of the amount of China"s ODI. The assessment using only positive ODI data is based on the following regression: Table 4 presents the results for the officially approved ODI data for the period 1991-2005. We start with a general-to-specific approach in the first stage and report all remaining significant variables in column (1). In the second stage, we again employ the general-to-specific approach including the estimated reverse Mills ratio based on the results of column (1). As to the estimator used: the Hausman test did not reject the null hypothesis, suggesting that the use of a random-effects estimator is not inappropriate, while the Lagrange-multiplier test (LM test, which compares the OLS estimator with the random effects estimator) shows the existence of random effects, which makes pooled OLS estimates less efficient and thus inappropriate. We use a random effects estimator 9 with year-fixed effects. The F-statistic indicates that the yearfixed effects are jointly significant.
The results for the first-stage regression are broadly in line with the findings as reported in Table 3 , suggesting that the decision to invest is primarily driven by political factors and host-country characteristics, although also GDP and EX come out highly significant. Table 4 also suggests that the factors determining the decision to invest are not the same as the factors determining the amount to be invested. For instance GDP and Law and
Order are significant in the first stage regression, but not in the second. Likewise, Proj is significant in the second stage, but not in the first. Now the coefficient of Law and Order has the expected sign, while the results for Corruption are in line with our previous findings.
[Insert Table 4 here] Since the ODI data are "censored" at zero and below, we estimate Tobit models. In addition, we use the Heckman (1979) method that allows us to separate the investment decision process into two stages. First, a decision is taken whether to invest in a host country.
If this is the case, the second decision is how much to invest in the country concerned.
[Insert Table 6 here] Table 6 summarizes our results. Our main findings are that in the models for the first dataset political variables seem to dominate economic determinants of China"s ODI in Africa.
The likelihood that a country receives ODI from China increases if the country concerned is a political ally of China, has diplomatic relations with China, is corrupt, democratic, and politically stable. In contrast, for the second dataset most political variables turn out to be insignificant. According to our estimates for the more recent period, China"s ODI in Africa is mainly driven by economic ties (trade and projects) and the drive for natural resources. The
Heckman models suggest that the decision to invest in a country is to some extent driven by different factors than the decision how much to invest in a country. 03 Notes: t-statistics are reported below coefficient "*", "**", "***"denote significant levels at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Pseudo R-squared gives the McFadden's R-squared. Notes: t-statistics are reported below coefficient "*", "**", "***"denote significant levels at the 10%, 5%, 1% level, respectively. Pseudo R-squared gives the McFadden's R-squared.
(1) (2) (3) We report the estimation results from the random-effect Probit panel regressions for the first stage regression. For the second stage, we use Random-effect estimator and include year-fixed effects, which are jointly significant at least 10 percent. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange-multiplier test for random effects (short for LM test) is performed here and the result suggests random effects estimator is more appropriate than pooled OLS. The t-statistics (robust in 2nd stage) are reported in second rows. Pseudo R-squared gives McFadden's Rsquared. "*", "**", "***" denote significant levels at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. Notes: We report the estimation results from the random-effect Probit panel regressions for the first stage regression. For the second stage, we use Random-effect estimator and include year-fixed effects, which are jointly significant at least 10 percent. The Breusch and Pagan Lagrange-multiplier test for random effects (short for LM test) is performed here and the result suggests random effects estimator is more appropriate than pooled OLS. The t-statistics (robust in 2nd stage) are reported in second rows. Pseudo R-squared gives McFadden's Rsquared. "*", "**", "***" denote significant levels at the 1%, 5%, 10% levels, respectively. 
